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City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
Upon a claim for damages based upon inverse condemnation of private property, due to a public entity’s purchase and demolition of adjacent property, the California Appellate Court recently held that the cause of action fails where the homeowner cannot prove that the public entity engaged in unreasonable activity and that the alleged condemnation was part of a plan to convert the plaintiff’s property to public use. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 210.
In approximately 2000, the City of Los Angeles (“City”) approved the Voluntary Residential Acquisition and Relocation Program (“Program”), which allowed the City to purchase private property in certain neighborhoods directly adjacent to the Los Angeles International Airport (“LAX”). The stated purpose of the Program was to reduce the impact of airport noise upon residents by allowing the City to purchase property from “all owners who voluntarily request [that the City] acquire their residential properties (single and multi-family) and to provide relocation assistance services to [their] owners and tenants.” Id., at 216, fn.3.
By 2009, certain homeowners claimed that the City had acquired nearly 95% of the single family dwellings and 72% of the multi-family dwellings in those neighborhoods. Id., at 215. Furthermore, they asserted that the City began demolishing many of the structures they had purchased via the Program, leaving the properties vacant and unmaintained. Id., at 217. Additionally, they claimed that the City used some of the now-vacant buildings for police or fire department training, and allowed film crews to stage explosion or fire scenes, thus dramatically reducing the residential qualities that the neighborhoods formerly possessed. Id.
Those homeowners ultimately filed an inverse condemnation suit against the City, alleging that the Program and the City’s subsequent use of the property it acquired via the Program negatively affected the property values of those who chose not to participate in the ‘voluntary’ Program. Id., at 217. As a result, plaintiffs further claimed that the Program was not voluntary but instead coercive and part of a larger plan to expand LAX into their neighborhood and assert de facto eminent domain without just compensation.
In response, the City maintained that the Program was voluntary and was initiated in response to requests for buyout and relocation from property owners living in the afflicted neighborhoods. Id., at 219. Furthermore, even if demolition of purchased structures caused a blight, it was more appropriate than re-leasing the homes and/or maintaining the neighborhood since the objective of the Program was to “mitigate incompatible residential land uses affected by noise from airport operations.” Id. The Trial Court agreed with Plaintiffs and entered summary judgment in their favor. The City appealed.
Upon review, the Appellate Court stated that a cause of action for inverse condemnation required the property owner to show three fundamental elements (1) that a public entity invaded or appropriated “some valuable property right which the property owner possesses”, (2) that such invasion or appropriation directly and specifically caused the property owner to suffer a legally cognizable injury, and (3) that the resulting damage resulted “from an exercise of governmental power while seeking to promote the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of the government.” Id., at 221; quoting, Beaty v. Imperial Irrigation District (1986)186 Cal.App.3d 897, 903; also quoting, Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 867.
Plaintiffs’ evidence failed the Appellate Court’s scrutiny. In a detailed review of established precedent, the Court noted that direct public ownership of the property at issue is not required in order to show a ‘taking’ or ‘appropriation’ of property. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, at 221. However, where property is simply located next to a public project, the courts have not recognized a decline in property value as a qualifying injury. [Emphasis added.] Id. Furthermore, as a property owner does not have an appurtenant right entitling him to the maintenance of adjacent properties, a public entity’s actions in legally creating a “visual blight” on those properties does not form the basis for an inverse condemnation action. Id; see also, Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343, at 355-356; see also, Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Services (1999) 76 Cal. App. 4th 521, 529, 532.
The Appellate Court noted that inverse condemnation can also be established where a public entity formulates a long-term plan to acquire property for a public purpose but pursues the plan in an unreasonable manner by “excessively delaying initiation of an eminent domain action or other oppressive conduct”. Id., at 225; see also, Klopping v. City of Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 52. Accordingly, the Appellate Court looked at whether the City’s Program was part of an overarching plan to expand LAX into the neighborhood by purchasing property from voluntary sellers through the Program, blighting the area to reduce the market price of the non-participating properties, and then negotiating for the purchase of plaintiffs’ properties at a reduced price.
However, the Appellate court again found plaintiffs’ evidence lacking. Plaintiffs failed to show that City acquired the property to expand LAX or to put the property to a public use. The stated purpose of the Program was simply to mitigate the effects of noise pollution upon the neighborhood and the City’s actions reflected that purpose as the acquired properties had been progressively left vacant for nearly a decade. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, at 226-228. Furthermore, the Court found that the City’s actions in blighting the area were quite reasonable and not oppressive as efforts to maintain the residential quality of the neighborhood would run contrary to the purpose of the Program as new residents would be subjected to the very same noise pollution that the Program was designed to alleviate. Id., at 226-227. Accordingly, the Appellate Court determined that plaintiffs could not summarily succeed on their inverse condemnation cause of action against the City.
The Appellate Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case back to the Trial Court for further action consistent with its opinion.
Kelly Seelig
Frank T. Sabaitis
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