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A PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM IS SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD IF IT ALLEGES EXPOSURE TO A SPECIFIC PRODUCT
Jones, et al. v. ConocoPhillips, et al.
(California Appellate Court, August 30, 2011)
In Jones, et al. v. ConocoPhillips, et al., the California Court of Appeals (Second Dist.) ruled that at the pleading stage of proceedings, a products liability claim based upon toxic exposure need not identify a specific toxin to which a plaintiff was exposed, but only exposure to a specific product.
Factual Background
Carlos Jones (“Carlos”) died in 2008 after suffering heart, liver, and kidney ailments. Jones’ wife and children (the “Joneses”) filed a lawsuit in 2009 against Carlos’ former employers, The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (“Goodyear”) and The Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”). The Joneses also named 19 manufacturers of 34 different chemical products as defendants, alleging that Carlos was exposed to the different chemicals while employed by Goodyear and Upjohn. The Joneses’ alleged that each of the identified chemical products contained toxins that were a substantial factor in causing Carlos’ illness and death.
Several defendants named in the Joneses’ operative complaint filed demurrers, arguing that the complaint failed to plead causation of Carlos’ injuries with the required level of specificity. In particular, the defendants argued that the complaint failed to sufficiently identify the particular toxins and products that allegedly caused Carlos’ illness. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers and entered a judgment of dismissal as to certain causes of action alleged in the Joneses’ complaint. The Joneses appealed the Court’s dismissal judgment.
The Appellate Court’s Holding
On appeal, the Appellate Court overruled the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, holding that the Joneses allegations regarding causation were sufficient and the Joneses’ claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of implied warranty were properly plead.
i. Allegations Regarding Causation Sufficiently Alleged
The Court of Appeals (the “Jones Court”) ruled that the Joneses’ allegations regarding causation were sufficiently plead under California law. The causation pleading threshold for a complaint alleging harmful exposure to toxic materials was established by California’s Supreme Court in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71 (“Bockrath”). The Bockrath Court established the following pleading requirement for a plaintiff alleging injury resulting from exposure to toxic materials: (1) plaintiff’s exposure to each of the toxic materials claimed to have caused a specific illness, (2) identification of each product that that caused the injury, (3) that the toxins entered plaintiff’s body as a result of exposure, (4) the plaintiff suffers from a specific illness, (5) each toxin that entered plaintiff’s body was a substantial factor in bringing about, prolonging, or aggravating that illness, and (6) each toxin absorbed by plaintiff was manufactured or supplied by a named defendant. (Bockrath, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 80.) The Jones Court noted that Bockrath rejected the defendants’ argument that a complaint is insufficiently plead if a plaintiff has not specifically identified which toxin contained in a product caused the alleged injury or has sued the manufacturers of multiple products, alleging that all of them contained toxins that were substantial factors in causing his injury. (Id. at 10-11.)
Addressing the concern identified by the Bockrath Court, and argued by the defendants, regarding overbroad litigation, the Jones Court pointed to Bockrath’s mandate. While Bockrath recognized that plaintiffs may genuinely lack information about the specific cause of their injury, they should not be barred from pursuing their claims. (Id. at 15.) The remedy for improperly speculative pleading is codified in California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, which imposes an obligation on a plaintiff to ensure that factual allegations are made in good faith and have, or are likely to have, evidentiary support. (Id.) The Jones Court concluded that judgment against a plaintiff at the pleading stage is unwarranted based on his or her inability to identify a specific causative agent for a chemically induced injury. (Id. at 17.) Thus, once the plaintiff has identified the chemical product, an allegation that toxins entered the plaintiff’s body and were a substantial factor in bringing about illness is sufficient. (Id. at 11-12.)
ii. Claims for Fraudulent Concealment and Breach of Implied Warranty
As to the Joneses’ claims for fraudulent concealment and breach of implied warranty, the Jones Court ruled that each was sufficiently plead.
As to the Joneses’ fraudulent concealment claim, the Jones Court noted that fraud does not always arise from an affirmative misstatement of material fact, but can also arise from suppression of that which is one’s duty to declare. (Id. at 19.) Thus, the Joneses’ allegation that the defendants owed a duty to share information about the toxic hazards of their products with expected users, like Carlos, was sufficient. Consequently, the Joneses should be permitted to explore the extent of the defendants’ knowledge of those hazards in discovery without first being required to identify specific acts by defendants in the complaint. (Id. at 21.) The Appellate Court also noted that a duty to disclose may arise, absent a fiduciary relationship, when a defendant possesses or exerts control over material facts not readily available to the plaintiff. (Id. at 22-23.)
With respect to the Joneses’ claim for breach of implied warranty, the Jones Court recognized the general rule that such a claim requires privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant. (Id. at 26.) Despite this general rule, however, the Jones Court held that a claim for breach of implied warranty is viable as to potentially hazardous chemical products manufactured and sold to companies for use by their employees in the manufacturing process. (Id. at 27-28.) Thus, because Carlos was an employee of the purchasers of the hazardous chemical products for use in the workplace, the Joneses’ claim was proper. (Id. at 28.)
Sabaitis O’Callaghan has experience representing parties in toxic tort cases and is currently representing a defendant in a case factually analogous to Jones v. ConocoPhillips. If you need a copy of the opinion or would like to discuss these issues please contact us.
Frank T. Sabaitis
Brad A. Byszewski
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